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On 6 February 2015 the I nve s t i ga to r y  Power s Tr i b u n a l  ( I P T )  r u l e d that unti l  5 December 
2014, the UK Intelligence Services’ 
practice of accessing surveillance 
information obtained by the United 
States’ spy agency, the NSA, was 
unlawful. Significantly, 5 December 
2014 was the date that the IPT 
published an interim decision in the 
case, and that publication made a 
key difference.
Both sides in the case immediately 
c l a i m e d  v i c t o r y.  P r i v a c y  I n t e r-
national, a member of the coalition 
of civi l  l iberty organisations that 
b ro u g h t  t h e  c o m p l a i n t  i n  t h e 
aftermath of the Edward Snowden 
disclosures, celebrated the decision 
as the first time that a British court 
has ruled against the Intell igence 
Services’ use of their interception 
powers. Downing Street and GCHQ, 
on the other hand, welcomed the 
dec is ion’s  conf i rmat ion that  the 
UK’s current regime is lawful. To the 
extent that in “one small respect” 
the program had been unlawful, the 
government noted, the problem had 
already been remedied.
This paper makes three key points. 
First, despite finding illegality on the 
part of the government, the IPT’s 
decision has substantially lowered 
ex ist ing human r ights  standards 
perta in ing to state surve i l lance. 
Second, the procedures of the IPT 
blur the line between the judiciary 
a n d  t h e  e x e c u t i v e ,  c o n j o i n i n g 
execut ive and judic ia l  act ions in 
one process. Finally, although the 
case nominally pertains to privacy, 
the IPT did not expressly find any 
v i o l a t i on  o f  p r i v a c y  no r  d i d  i t 
conduct any rigorous review of the 
actual practices of the Intelligence 
Services. The ultimate question in 
this case was to decide how much 
information about the internal rules 
of a fundamentally secret system of 
surveillance must be made public.
1. Publicity, not privacy
Historical ly, the common law did 
not recognise a right to privacy in 
the UK. No one had a general right 
to expect that his or her personal 
information would be respected by 
the state under UK law. If officers 
of the state came to your home to 
search your papers without a lawful 
warrant, you had to sue them under 
trespass, not privacy. Therefore in 
the age of telecommunications and 
the Post Office, where spying could 
occur invisibly, without trespass, 
no law protected the pr ivacy of 
communications. This changed with 
the growing application of human 
rights under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), now fully 
incorporated to domestic law. In the 
watershed case of Malone v UK (1985) 
the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) held that police phone tapping 
was a violation of article 8 – the right 
to privacy – because there was no law 
authorising the action. If the state is 
going to eavesdrop on citizens, it first 
has to create a framework of legislation 
to authorise and control it. This led 
to the UK putting its three secret 
Intelligence Services on a statutory 
footing (MI5 in 1989, MI6 and GCHQ 
in 1994). The statutes require all their 
actions to be ultimately justified by one 
of three broad headings of national 
security, economic well-being of 
the UK, or preventing serious crime, 
and reviewable by a Parliamentary 
committee called the Intelligence and 
Security Committee (ISC). 
The key issue in this case was whether 
or not an acceptable legal framework 
covers the alleged surveillance practices 
outlined in Snowden’s disclosures. The 
ECtHR’s core requirements for such a 
framework were outlined in Kennedy 
v UK: 
“First, the impugned [surveillance] 
measure must have some basis in 
domestic law. Second, the domestic 
law must be compatible with the 
rule of law and accessible to the 
person concerned. Third, the person 
affected must be able to foresee the 
consequences of the domestic law 
for him…”
In other words, the Kennedy case 
concerns the quality of the law that 
authorizes the spying. It must be 
publicly accessible, and the conditions 
under which eavesdropping can be 
practiced must be foreseeable. The 
claimants successfully argued that 
neither criterion applies to the sharing 
of intercepted mater ial  between 
the US spy agency NSA and their 
UK counterpart GCHQ, therefore 
such sharing is unlawful. A second 
ground of challenge concerned the 
adequacy of the UK’s existing domestic 
framework, RIPA, to communication 
technology in internet age. That 
ground was rejected by the Tribunal, 
and is not within the scope of this 
briefing paper.
The IPT found that there was no 
pub l i c l y  a c ce s s i b l e  f r am ework 
govern ing  in te l l igence-shar ing , 
hence any such sharing of intercept 
material between NSA and GCHQ 
was unlawful. However, the judgment 
simultaneously departed from the 
required standards of accessibility and 
foreseeability required by the ECtHR 
in Kennedy. Reasoning that it would 
be self-defeating to require secret 
intelligence services to publish its rules 
and policies in detail, the IPT’s test of 
whether or not the regime is lawful is 
reformulated at paragraph 37 of the 
December judgment:
“(i) there must not be an unfettered 
discretion for executive action. There 
must be controls on the arbitrariness 
of that action.
(ii) the nature of the rules must be 
clear and the ambit of them must 
be in the public domain so far as 
possible, an “adequate indication” 
given (Malone v UK [1985] 7 EHRR 14 
at paragraph 67), so that the existence 
of interference with privacy may in 
general terms be foreseeable (…)
Consequently, the law must indicate 
the scope of any such discretion 
con fe r r ed  on  the  compe ten t 
authorities and the manner of its 
exercise with sufficient clarity to give 
the individual adequate protection 
against arbitrary interference.”
This test will be met if (paragraph 41):
“(i) Appropriate rules or arrangements 
exist and are publicly known and 
confirmed to exist, with their content 
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sufficiently signposted, such as to give 
an adequate indication of it…
(i i )  They are subject to proper 
oversight.”
Apply ing this  test ,  the IPT then 
looked in closed hearings for secret 
“arrangements” that can be made 
“publicly known to exist” and their 
content “sufficiently signposted”. The 
system is already subjected to “proper 
oversight” by the ISC, the Interception 
of Communication Commissioner’s 
Office (IOCCO), and of course the IPT. 
Overall, this is a much lower standard 
of publicity than that which the ECtHR 
called for in Kennedy v UK. 
Because the legislation that created the 
IPT contains an ouster clause preventing 
any party from appealing the case 
domestically, the claimants have taken 
the case directly to the ECtHR. If the 
IPT’s new standard is upheld there, then 
in the long run the government’s victory 
extends far beyond this case. European 
governments  engaged in  secret 
surveillance for the purposes of national 
security would need only to give vague 
confirmation that there are secret 
“arrangements” in place, “signposting” 
the gist of what those arrangements 
mean. The public is left to trust that 
the arrangements are effective, relying 
on oversight bodies such as the ISC, 
IOCCO, and indeed the IPT itself to 
provide second-order confirmation 
that the arrangements are real, are 
being applied, and that normal life can 
continue. This is a legal negotiation over 
the limits of open government, and it is 
thus a constitutionally significant issue. 
2. The IPT blurs the 
separation of powers
The IPT dealt with this case in both open 
and closed, i.e. secret, hearings. During 
closed session, the IPT looked in detail 
at the secret internal arrangements 
concerned with intelligence sharing. This 
led to further disclosure of a summary 
of secret internal “arrangements”, 
recorded at paragraph 47 of the 
December judgment. The “disclosure” 
appears to take the form of written 
representations by the government’s 
legal team. It is not a separate published 
document. It does not take the form 
of a witness statement, unlike other 
government evidence in the case. 
Undated, it gives no indication as to 
when these policies were made, how 
they are enforced, what training is 
provided to staff, or anything at all 
indicative of their quality and efficacy. 
The disclosure is surprisingly thin, given 
the weight attached to it by the IPT. In 
fact, it closely mirrors the government’s 
earlier legal submissions on the point, 
i.e. that GCHQ treats all intelligence 
data received from foreign agencies as 
if it were obtained under the domestic 
legal framework, the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). 
By framing this as a factual account 
of what does happen in practice, 
rather than legal submissions as to 
what would happen in principle, the 
government enabled the IPT to view the 
disclosure as new information, newly 
admitted to the public domain via the 
mechanism of the IPT’s own written 
judgment. The performative power of 
the disclosure was thus determinative of 
the case. The conclusion on intelligence 
sharing is that these “arrangements 
below the waterline” afford adequate 
protection from abuse, and that they 
are now made sufficiently clear to the 
public in summary form such that there 
is no longer any violation of human 
rights law. 
The Tribunal did not finally determine 
the matter in December, instead inviting 
the parties to make sub-missions as 
to the effect of its initial findings. The 
ultimate question then was whether or 
not this meant that the position prior 
to the 5 December 2014 judgment 
was unlawful. The second part of the 
judgment, given on 6 February 2015, 
found that intelligence sharing had 
previously been unlawful but is now 
lawful thanks to the publication of the 
December judgment. Put like this, the 
result appears paradoxical: an unlawful 
situation was rendered lawful by the 
very process in which its legality was 
challenged. Of course, it was not the 
fact of the challenge that made the 
difference, but rather the disclosure 
that was published in the decision. 
Nonetheless, the surprising function of 
the IPT in this case was simultaneously 
to provide both the review and the 
remedy in law. This bears comparison 
to the most formalistic conception 
of legality, whereby all that matters 
normatively is that there is some law in 
place. It also marks a new dimension of 
the IPT’s inquisitorial status: it not only 
enquires, it also bridges the secret realm 
to the public realm.
In  so  do ing,  the  const i tu t iona l 
separation of powers between the 
executive and the judiciary is blurred. 
The executive was acting unlawfully but 
through collaboration with the judicial 
process, behind closed doors, it righted 
the wrong. 
3. No actual violation of 
privacy was found 
To conc lude,  i t  i s  important  to 
again emphasise that insofar as 
the government’s act iv it ies were 
ruled unlawful, that concerned the 
publication of their secret internal 
arrangements. This does not mean 
that the government was engaged in 
the worst implications of Snowden’s 
disclosures, such as unlimited mass 
surveillance, snooping on all of the 
population, and building a huge 
database of all of our personal details. 
In fact the IPT was at pains to say the 
opposite is the case: that surveillance 
powers are used only against those who 
would threaten the security of the UK 
in some respect. However, the definition 
of such a threat rests with the executive, 
acting on secret intelligence advice, and 
is not subject to judicial review. 
Meanwhile, while we await the hearing 
of the case before the ECtHR, a new 
government programme of publicising 
summaries of secret arrangements is 
already well under way. Government 
lawyers have made a concession 
in the on-going Belhaj case before 
the IPT, conceding that they should 
have published “arrangements” that 
ensure intercepted material between 
lawyers and clients litigating against 
the government is not passed to the 
government legal teams fighting 
the case – a fundamental feature of 
Legal Professional Privilege necessary 
for a fair trial. It seems that no such 
formal arrangements existed, but the 
government denies that any previous 
trial has ever been contaminated. The 
government is also rushing through new 
policies to protect journalistic sources, 
aware that the media in particular have 
a strong interest in these events. But the 
ultimate problem of trying to balance 
secrecy and accountability always makes 
legality itself dependent on some degree 
of public trust in authority, while at the 
same time undermining the open basis 
on which that trust should rest. These 
are fundamentally political matters 
that concern the very security of a 
democratic society. Strasbourg’s decision 
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